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This article describes the results o[ the reliability and availability analyses of
the individual S- and X-band traveling-wave maser (TWM) assemblies and their
operational configurations in the 70-meter antennas of NASA 's DSNI For the pe-
riod 1990 through 1991, the TWM availability parameters for the Telemetry Data
System are: mean time between failures (MTBF), 930 hr; mean time to restore
service (MTTRS), 1.4 hr; and the average availability, 99.85 percent. In previously
published articles, the performance analysis of the TWM assemblies was confined to
the determination of the parameters specified above. However, as the mean down
time (MDT) for the repair of TWMs increases, the levels of the TWM operational
availabilities and MTTRS are adversely affected. In this article, a more comprehen-
sive TWM availability analysis is presented to permit evaluation oFboth MTBF and
MDT effects. Performance analysis of the TWM assemblies, based on their station
monthly failure reports, indicates that the TWMs required MTBF and MDT levels
of 3000 hr and 36 to 48 hr, respectively, have been achieved by the TWMs only
at the Canberra Deep Space Station (DSS 43). The Markov Process technique is
employed to develop suitable availability measures for the S- and X-band TWM
configurations when each is operated in a two-assembly standby mode. The derived
stochastic expressions allow for the evaluation of those configurations' simultaneous
availability for the Antenna Microwave Subsystem. The application of these ex-
pressions to demonstrate the impact of various levels of TWM maintainability (or
MDT) on their configurations' operational availabilities is presented for each of the
70-m antenna stations.
I. Introduction
The traveling-wave maser (TWM) assemblies exist as
part of the Antenna Microwave Subsystem (UWV) at each
Deep Space Station (DSS). They are used on the large an-
tenna structures at the Goldstone, Madrid, and Canberra
communication complexes. The technical performance of
TWMs as well as their operational availability are critical
factors in the performance of the DSN. The important per-
formance and operational characteristics of these TWMs
are presented in Section iI.C of this article.
Previous analyses of the performance reliability and
availability of the DSN TWMs are described in [1,2].
These were confined to the mean time between failure
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: _(M_BF) determinati0nTor t]_ TWMs network-wide, and
their average avai|ability for the DSN Telemetry System
: - : o_/o_the:period 1981 through 1983. The results indicated
__ that the averaged MTBF (1200 hr) was considerably below
the desired level and the averaged MTTRS (2-5 hr) was
very long as compared with the requirements. Therefore,
a number of recommendations were made to improve the
TWM assembly availability characteristics.
Achieving high levels of reliability and availability for
the TWM assemblies is a very demanding task. It requires
continued improvements in the TWM assembly mainte-
nance procedures, as well as in the assembly's engineering
development process. In recent years, it has become ap-
parent that the availability of the TWM assemblies has
been degrading. Their operational MTBF is currently be-
lieved to be in the range of 1000 to 1400 hr (except for the
Canberra complex). This situation demonstrates the need
to quantitatively assess the operational availability of the
TWMs.
This article is the first of two on the availability mod-
eling and analysis of the DSN TWM configurations. The
analysis in this article, Part I, was performed on the TWM
configurations in the 70-m antenna subnet. Part II will
present the results of the analysis performed on the TWM
configurations in the 34-m antenna subnets.
block diagram of these TWM configurations as part of a
70-m Antenna Microwave Subsystem.
A single TWM assembly consists basically of a maser
(amplifier) and its closed-cycle refrigerator (CCR), re-
ferred to simply as the TWM assembly. Figure 2 shows
the TWM and CCR equipment connections.
B. Theory of Operation
The TWM assembly provides low-noise amplification
for the received S- or X-band frequency. To accomplish
this, the maser (amplifier) is cooled to approximately
4.5 K using closed-cycle refrigeration. To initiate a maser
cooldown, the helium compressor (Fig. 2) circulates he-
lium gas to and from the helium refrigerator at controlled
pressure and flow rates. The helium refrigerator cools the
helium until some of the gas reaches a liquid state (4.5 K)
at the bottom of the refrigerator (the cold station). The
maser is physically attached to the cold station and is
cooled to the correct operating temperature of 4.5 K by
metallic conduction. I
C. Functional Requirements
This section contains data related to the performance
requirements and operational characteristics (reliability
and availability) of the TWM assemblies in the 70-m an-
tenna subnet.
Section II of this article provides the functional descrip- 1. Performance Requirements. The TWM assem-
tion and operational characteristics of these TWMs. See- blies perform the function of low-noise amplification for
tion III presents the application of the Fault Tree Analysis the received S- and X'band frequencies. The basic perfor-
(FTA) technique to the failure analysis of a TWM assem-
bly and provides the results of the quantitative availabil-
ity evaluation of individual TWMs. Section IV applies a
Markov Process technique to derive the steady-state avail-
ability expressions for the TWM configurations. Section
V describes the application of the derived expressions to
the availability analysis of the TWM configurations in the
70-m antennas. Section VI provides a discussion of the
study findings and related observations. The last section
includes a summary and concluding remarks.
II. Description of TWM Configurations
in the 70-M Antennas
A. Functional Configuration
The TWM assemblies are the dominant elements of the
UWV at each of the 70-m antenna stations (DSS 14, DSS
43, and DSS 63). There are two TWM assemblies pro-
viding low-noise amplification at each of the S-band and
X-band frequency feeds. Figure 1 represents a functional
mance requirements for the TWMs at each frequency feed
are given in Table 1.
The total performance of the entire antenna system
(i.e., Antenna Mechanical and Antenna Microwave Sub-
systems) is impacted by gain and noise temperature contri-
butions of the TWMs, as well as by other critical elements
of the system.
2. Operational Characteristics. The TWM assem-
blies were designed to demonstrate an operational (field)
performance that meets the following characteristics: _
(1) Functional availability of at least 0.998, since the
desired availability for the Antenna Microwave Sub-
system is at least 0.996.
1General Procedures, "S-Band Travellng-Wave Maser Group Block
IV," TM03703 (internal document), Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Pasadena, California, September 15, 19";'9,
2 Communication Complex System Functional Requirements (1991-
1996), "Antenna Microwave Subsystem," 824-16 (internal docu-
ment), Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pas_ena, California, November
1, 1991.
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(2) An MTBF levelinexcessof 3000 hr.
(3) MTTRS for a single-channeloperation (TWM
backup isavailable)of 5 rain.with a maximum of
10 rain.
(4) Mean down time (MDT) of a TWM assembly for
repairmaintenance isa maximum of48 hr.
A TWM failure(due to itsCCR failure)isrecognized
by the operator when deviationsfrom requirements are
detected in the CCR operating parameters (temperature
levels,pressurelevels,and helium flow rates).Also,major
discrepanciesinthe observed antenna gain tosystem noise
temperature ratiowould indicatea possibleTWM failure.
Iil. Individual Performance Analysis of
TWM Assemblies
In thissection,the individualperformance analysisof
TWM assembliesispresented using both qualitativeand
quantitativeapproaches. The two basicobjectivesof this
analysisare
(1) To develop an understanding of the TWM failure
characteristicspertinent to various failuremodes
and theireffects,which could be a usefultoolfor
TWM-CCR designreviews (SectionIII.A).
(2) To identifyrelevantoperationalperformance mea-
suresrelatedtoreliability,maintainability,and avail-
abilityofthe TWM assemblies(SectionIII.B).
A. Qualitative Failure Analysis
1. Failure Cause-Effect Analysis. The failure anal-
ysis of a TWM assembly is primarily concerned with iden-
tification of its failure effects, referred to as top events, and
determining how these can be caused by individual or com-
bined lower levelfailuresor faults.Standard symbols are
then used fordevelopingan FTA to describefailurevents
and theirlogicalconnectionsin relationto predeflnedtop
events (effects).The FTA technique and itsapplications
to reliabilityassessment are discussedin greaterdetailin
[3,4].
To demonstrate the applicationof the FTA technique
to the TWM-CCR failureanalysis,data relatedto failure
modes and faulteventsofTWMs were collectedand orga-
nized into some general cause-effectrelationships.Using
only the DSN Discrepancy Reports (DRs) and the sta-
tions'monthly failurereports,only top failureeffectsand
contributingfailureevents were possibleto identify.The
logicalconnectionsbetween failureventswere difficultto
determine based on the currentstationreportingforms.
Therefore, only a simple FTA is shown in Fig. 3 for a
TWM assembly, in which the top event isan operational
failure.The FTA shows that thisfailuremay be caused by
any of the first-levelfaiJuremodes (four-inputOR gate).
The analysisthen proceeds,asshown, by determininghow
each of the lower levelfailureevents can be caused by in- -- -
dividualbasicfaultsor events.
It isnoteworthy that a differentFTA willhave to be
constructed for each top failureevent of the TWM as-
sembly that can be caused by variousrelationsbetween
lower failureevents.Therefore,individualFTA should be
performed forthe major failureeffectsof the TWM, such
as cooldown failure,refrigeratorlow flow,and compressor
failure. These analyses are particularly relevant to the de-
velopment, operation, and maintenance improvements of
the TWM assemblies, since critical levels of failure would
indicate their contributions to the TWM reliability and
availability.
2. Failure-Cause Distribution. Analysis of 1990-
1991 TWM station failure reports gave the probability dis-
tribution of the major areas (causes) contributing to the
70-m TWM assembly failure. The distribution is sum-
marized in Table 2. Refrigerator contamination and low
helium flow proportions constitute about 65 percent of to-
tal TWM failures. More than 75 percent of the refriger-
ator failures were attributed to contamination of the he-
lium gas. A significant proportion of TWM failure was
attributed to the helium compressor failure.
B. Quantitative Availability Analysis
In this section, relevant availability factors and mea-
sures are quantitatively determined for the individual
TWM assemblies in the 70-m antenna subnet. The fac-
tors include MTBF, MDT for corrective maintenance, and
mean preventive-maintenance time (MPT); the measures
include operational availability (Ao) and achieved avail-
ability (Aa).
Data related to TWM assembly outages and service
restorations (during spacecraft scheduled support periods)
were taken from the DR System. However, since TWM
assembly failures (basically hardware-fault related) occur-
ring over nonspacecraft support periods are not reported
by the DR system, it is thought that the station monthly
failure and maintenance reports should also be reviewed
for this analysis.
1. Reliability (MTBF) Analysis. Earlier analy-
sis of the TWM failure data based on the DSN DRs was
reported in [1,2]. Network-wide estimates of MTBF as re-
ported for three different periods are shown in Table 3. An
265 _-
=_perat_ional MTBF ]eveT--oFap-_oxlmately 2500 to 3000 hr
wasconside_]a e_d_a_[e and achievable reliability target
for individual TWM assemblies.
This reliability analysis considers the individual perfor-
mances of the TWMs at DSS 14, DSS 43, and DSS 63.
The MTBF analysis is based on the station monthly fail-
ure reports for the period from November 1990 through
December 1991. Estimated MTBF levels for the individ-
ual TWMs at each station are summarized in Table 3. An
M'rBF level of 2400 to 3000 hr has been achieved by the
TWMs at the Canberra Complex (DSS 43). The TWMs
at DSS 14 demonstrated an MTBF level in the range of
1400 to 1600 hr, whereas the MTBF level for the TWMs
at DSS 63 is in the range of 1400 to 1900 hr.
2. Availability Analysis. Determination of TWM
availability includes (1) a data-availability estimate of
TWMs relative to each DSN data system, which is de-
termined for a total scheduled mission-support time over
a given period and (2) an overall-availability estimate of
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Ao = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT)
A_ = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT+MPT)
where
MTBF = MTTF (mean time to failureonly)
MDT = (waiting-timeto restoreservice
+ logisticdelay time
+ correctivemaintenance time
+ CCR decontamination time
+ assembly cooldown and testingtime)
MPT = (preventive-maintenancetime
+ decontamination time
+ cooldown and testingtime)
(I)
(2)
dicatean improvement in both repairand operating pro-
cedures.The TWMs at both DSS 14 and DSS 63 demon-
stratedrelativelyhigherMDT levels.
IV. Operational Availability Modeling
of TWM Configurations
In thissection,the operationalavailabilityperformance
ofthe X- and S-band TWM configurationsisbeing consid-
ered for modeling. Each configurationismost frequently
operated as a two-assembly standby configuration.The
availabilitymeasure for the case of the two-assembly par-
allelconfigurationwas derivedin [5,6].
The purpose of this modeling effortisto derive the
steady-stateavailabilitymeasures for the TWM standby
configurationusing the Markov Procen technique dis-
cussed in [6,7].In the followingsubsections,the model
assumptions, model formulation,and the derived avail-
abilitymeasures for the TWM standby configurationare
presented.
A. Model Assumptions
The followingare the basicassumptions of the Markov
model forthe TWM configurationsunder study:
(1) The model represents an S- or X-band TWM
standby configurationconsistingof two redundant
assembliesand a singlemaintenance technician.
b. Overall availability of TWMs. This availability in-
cludes the determination of the TWM operational avail-
ability (Ao) and achieved availability (As) levels. For eval-
uating these measures, failure and maintenance data were
taken from the 70-m stations' TWM monthly performance
reports. Then operational and achieved availabilities for
the individual TWMs were determined, as shown in Table
6, for the period November 1, 1990, through December 31,
1991, using the relationships provided in [3,4] as follows:
The average TWM availabilityfor telemetry data is
99.8 percent. The average MTBF of a TWM assembly
(approximately 930 hr) isgood relativeto that of other
major Telemetry System elements;however, itisconsider-
ably lowerthan the desiredMTBF levelof2500 to3000 hr.
The average MTTRS (1.4hr) isrelativelyhigh and faroff
the servicerestorationrequirements (theseincludemean
and maximum durations of 15 and 30 min, respectively,
forallsupport activities).
a. Dala.Availabiliiy of TWMs. This availability for
any data system is a function of both MTBF (or data-
outage rate) and MTTRS. Separate analyses were con-
ducted on the Antenna Microwave Subsystem availability
for the Telemetry Data System and the individual 70-m
station TWM availability for the Telemetry Data System
for the period 1990 through 1991. The outage data for
these analyses were obtained from the DR system, and
the resultsare shown in Tables 4 and 5,respectively.
TWMs determined forthe totalperiod considered(includ-
ing mission and other activitysupport times). The lower MDT levelsforDSS-43 TWM assembliesin-
(2) The stochastic failure and repair processes for the
operating assembly are stationary (constant failure
and repair rates).
(3) The repair activity and its duration (total downtime)
of the failed TWM covers the time for corrective
maintenance and the total time for decontamination
and cooldown processes.
(4) The backup TWM is warm (power-connected) but
in a nonoperating mode (i.e., it receives only a du-
plicate signal and does not provide output to other
processors in the link). Therefore, it is assumed that
the standby TWM has a negligibly small failure rate
(an approximate zero rate) relative to that of the
prime operating TWM.
(5) In the initial operating state of the TWM configu-
ration, State 1, one of the TWM assemblies is in an
operable standby mode.
(6) During the TWM operation, only one change can
take place in the state of the configuration at each
instantaneous increment of time.
B. Model Formulation
The state-space diagram associated with the TWM
standby configuration under study is shown in Fig. 4. The
following symbols are associated with this diagram:
i denotes the ith state of the TWM configuration, for
i = 1, 2, 3; where i -- I (one assembly is operating,
the other assembly is in standby mode); i = 2 (one
assembly failed and is under repair, the other assem-
bly is linked and operating); i = 3 (both TWMs are
down, and one of them is under repair).
Pi denotes the steady-state probability that the TWM
configuration is in State i, for i -" 1, 2, 3.
denotes the constant failure rate of the operating
TWM assembly.
p denotes the constant repair and maintenance of the
failed TWM assembly.
The steady-state availability model for this configura-
tion is developed using the frequency-balance principle of
the Markov Process theory as described in [5,7]. The fre-
quency balance equations for the three-state availability
model of Fig. 4 can be written as
State 1: _P1 = #P_ (3)
State 2: (A + p) P2 = AP1 + pP3 (4)
State 3: _'P_= _P2 (5)
Using Eqs. (3) and (5) and the unity equation P1 +
Pg. + P3 - 1, the state probability expressions are defined
as follows:
(6)
(7)
P3= ,W (._ + .x, + _,2) (8)
C. The Availability Measures
in the state-space model shown in Fig. 4, States i-and 2
represent the operating (up) states and State 3 represents
the failed (down) state of the configuration. Thus, using
the state probabilities given in Eqs. (6)-(8), the steady-
state operational availability measure of the standby con-
figuration, denoted by Ao, is given by
Ao = (#_+ _U)/ (_ + ;_, + _,_) (9)
and the steady-state unavailability measure of the standby
configuration, denoted by Uo, is given by
Vo= _2/(.x2+ .xu+ ,2) (10)
The availability measure given in Eq. (9) can also be
used to develop a simultaneous availability measure of X-
and S-band configurations for the UWV operational sup-
port at each 70-m antenna station. This is defined as
Ao(for antenna microwave) = Ao(X-band) x Ao(S-band)
(11)
The application of Eqs. (9) and (11) to evaluate the
availability of the X- and S-band TWM configurations at
each 70-m antenna station is presented in Section V.
V. Applications and Analysis
For the application of the availability measures given in
Eqs. (9) and (11), pooled MTBF and MDT levels were es-
timated for the X- and S-band TWM configurations using
their individual assembly MTBF and MDT levels, which
were computed earlier and listed in Table 6. The pooled
MTBF estimate for a TWM was computed as the average
of MTBF levels of the individual assemblies (in a configu-
ration) reduced by 30 to 35 percent of the total variation
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of an assembly MTBF level from that average MTBF. On
the other hand, the pooled MDT estimate for a TWM was
computed as the average of MDT levels of the individual
assemblies (in a configuration) rounded off to the closest
integer representing an average number of 12-hr mainte-
nance cycles (shifts) required for a TWM repair compl_
The estimates of pooled MTBF and MDT for the TWM
_semblies and their use for availability evaluation of the
X- and S-band configurations at each 70-m antenna station
are described as follows.
A. Availability of TWMs at DSS 14
The estimates of pooled MTBF and MDT for the prime
and backup assemblies of the X-band TWM configuration
are
MTBF = 1615 hr, or A = 0.000619 failure/hr
MDT = 84 hr, or # = 0.011904 repair/hr
and the estimates for each TWM assembly in the S-band
configuration are
MTBF = 1560 hr, or ,_ = 0.000641 failure/hr
MDT = 84 hr, or/_ = 0.011904 repair/hr
The application of the availability measure given in
- -- Eq. _9) tb th-e T_ C_g_kfi0ns at this station resu]]_s
in
operational availability of each individual configuration is
approximately 0.997, as compared with a desirable level of
0.998. This deviation is primarily attributed to both a low
MTBF level (1500 to 1600 hr) and a considerable MDT of
84 hr (3 to 3.5 days), as compared with the corresponding
parameter levels for the TWMs at the other stations.
The impact of improved TWM assembly reliability on
a configurati0n's operational availability at various levels
of assemb|y MDT is demonstrated in Fig. 5(a). An ex-
amination of the plots in this figure indicates that the op-
er£tibnal a_vai_b[i]t_requ_r-ement for each TWM configu-
ration, which is 0.998, can be achieved or even exceeded
when the reliability (MTBF) and maintainability (MDT)
parameters of its assemblies meet any of the following prac-
tically feas_Ie combinations:
(1) MTBF > 1500 hr; MDT _< 60 hr
(2) MTBF > 2000 hr; MDT _< 84 hr
B. Availability of TWMs at DSS 43
The estimates of pooled MTBF and MDT for each
TWM assembly in the X-band configuration are
MTBF = 2350 hr, or A = 0.000425 failure/hr
MDT = 36 hr;_or U = 0.0_777 repair/hr _
and the estimaies for each TWM assembly in the S-band
configuration are _ _: :: _ _:_ :
MTBF = 5080 hr, or ,_ = 0.000196 faiture/hr
Ao(X-band configuration) = 0.997435
Ao(S-band configuration) = 0.997256
The application of the availability measure given in
Eq. (11) results in the following simultaneous availability
of TWM configurations for the UWV subsystem:
Ao(for antenna microwave) = Ao(X-band) x Ao(S-band)
= 0.9947
..... The simultaneous availability of TWM configurati6ns; ....
wh_c_la_s 0.9947, is--sl]_y _ than its predated re-
quirement (i.e., 0.996) for the antenna microwave. The
2 _
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MDT = 36 hr, or/J = 0.027777 repair/hr
The application of the availability measures given in
Eqs. (9) and (11) to liheTrfC_lM--coiafigUratlons at this sta-
tion results in the following individual and simultaneous
avaiiabilities:_ :: _ i:_ ::: "=
Ao (X-band configuration) = 0.999768 _-
Ao (S-band configuration) = 0.999950
Ao(for antenna microwave) = 0.9997
The operational availability of both TWM configura-
tions at this station, which is 0.9997, is greater than the
m
predicted requirement of 0.996 for the period 1990 through
1991. The availability of individual configurations is rel-
atively high and in the range of 0.9997 to 0.9999 for this
period. This is primarily attributed to both a reasonable
MTBF level (2300 to 2500 hrs) and an acceptable MDT
of 36 hours (or 1.5 to 2 days).
The impact of improved TWM assembly reliability on a
configuration's operational availability at various levels of
assembly MDT is described in Fig. 5(b). The plots demon-
strate that the operational availability for each TWM con-
figuration will always meet or exceed the requirement at
the current MTBF level (greater than 2000 hr) for as long
as the MDT level remains at or below 60 hr.
C. Availability of TWMs at DSS 63
The estimates of pooled MTBF and MDT for each
TWM assembly in the X-band configuration are
MTBF = 1820 hr, or A = 0.000549 failure/hr
MDT = 60 hr, or/J = 0.016666 repair/hr
and the estimates for each TWM assembly in the S-band
configuration are
MTBF = 2525 hr, or _ = 0.000396 failure/hr
MDT = 36 hr, or/_ = 0.027777 repair/hr
The application of the availability measures given in
Eqs. (9) and (11) to the TWM configurations at this sta-
tion results in the following individual and simultaneous
availabilities:
Ao (X-band configuration) = 0.998948
Ao (S-band configuration) = 0.999799
Ao (for antenna microwave) = 0.9987
The operational availability of both TWM configurations
at this station, which is 0.9987, is slightly higher than the
predicted requirement of 0.996 for the period 1990 through
1991. The availability of the X-band TWM configuration
exceeds the required level of 0.998. For the S-band TWM
configuration, the availability is relatively high for this pe-
riod as a result of both a reasonable MTBF level (2525
hours) and an acceptable MDT level of 36 hours (less than
2 days).
The impact of increased TWM assembly reliability on a
configuration's operational availability at possible Ievels of
assembly MDT is described in Fig. 5(c). The plots demon-
strate that the operational availability for each TWM con-
figuration will a/ways exceed a level of 0.998 at the current
MTBF level (greater than 2000 hrs) for as long as the MDT
level remains at or below 48 hours.
VI. Discussion of the Findings and
Observations
In this section, the results of the operational re_bfllty
and availability analysis of the TWM configurations are
discussed. The appropriate items related to the improve-
ment of the TWM assembly availability characteristics are
a/so presented.
A. Discussion of the Findings
(1) Failure analysis of TWM-assemblies shows that the
helium refrigerator contamination is the dominant
cause of TW_TfaiIure (5-5 to_ percent of total fail-
ures). An earfieri-nvest_gati0n of this problem im-
plied the feasibility of detecting the development of
contamination 1 or 2 days in advance of a TWM
failure.
(2) The proportions of compressor and refrigerator
drive-unit failures (12 and 15 percent, respectively)
are considered significant, as compared with the fail-
ure percentages:for bthe_=_M elements. IU0ie[r-
failure frequencies were reduced, the TWM MTBF
would be considerably improved.
(3) The DR data show that the average MTTRS for the
TWMs (1.4 hr) relative to the DSN Telemetry Data
System is about two to three times as long as the
MTTRS of other telemetry elements. Improving the
MTTRS of the TWM assemblies to a desirable level
of 0.7 hr would essentially require improved TWM
backup availability. This is accomplished when re-
pair durations, and consequently MDT levels of the
TWMs, are reduced.
(4) Analysis of the 1990-1991 TWM station failure data
shows a significant variation in the MTBF level
at different complexes. The higher MTBF lev-
els for the TWMs at DSS 43 appear to have re-
sulted from improved repair procedures as well as
an increased level of preventive-maintenance activ-
ity prior to early 1990. On the other hand, TWMs at
DSS 14 and DSS 63 have demonstrated lower MTBF
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levels, which are believed to have resulted from less
efficient repair and preventive maintenance processes
at these stations.
(5) Analysis of the 1990-1991 TWM station repair data
shows a variation in the level of MDT for repair at
different complexes. For the TWM assemblies a_
DSS 43, the MDT level is relatively good (36 hr) and
__lower than MDT levels demonstrated at the other
stations (84 hr at DSS 14 and 48-60 hrs at DSS 63).
That is perhaps indicative of improved repair prac-
tices as well as better trained maintenance personnel
at the Canberra complex_ =_--- _ :_ _ -= =:_ ==
(6) TWM operational availabilities at the individual sta-
tions (computed ]by using the proposed measures),
are in close agreement with their average availabili-
ties for the Telemetry Data System (generated from
the DR system). These availabilities at the individ-
ual stations are compared in Table 7.
The variations in corresponding TWM availabilities at
different stations are primarily attributed to the effect
of incorporating the MDT parameter into the proposed
TWM availability measures. The use 0f TWM MDT is
more appropriate than tile MTTRS parameter for their op-
erational availability evaluations since the former is more
representative of T_VM actual unavailable (repair) times.
B. Observations
The following observations, which are primarily drawn
from the previous work reported in [2],_areb_edon the
findings of the TW_M failure-cause analysis.
(1) Solution of tile helium gas contamination problem
would reap the greatest dividends. The composition
and sources of contamination have to be better under-
stood. Some of the items related to this area include
(a) Implementation of the previously proposed com-
puter-based monitoring and data-collection and
analysis system for the TWM CCRs would improve
the identification of possible CCR faults before they
cause TWM failUre. ..........
(b) Improved field techniques for measuring gaseous im-
purities and other contaminants in helium would be
very valuable.
(c) Improved gas flow meters and gauges of the helium
refrigerators and compressors would allow for the
detection of helium low flow and improve the quality
of recorded performance data.
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(2) An understanding of the contribution of the compres-
sor oil to contamination at increased temperatures is
needed, as is a mechanism to replace in-service com-
pressor filters and adsorbers without affecting maser
operation.
(3) A detailed failure mode analysis, preferably using the
FTA technique, for the helium compressors and refrig-
erators to reduce their current significant contributions
to TWM failure is yet to be done and would be part of
another phi.
The following observations are based primarily on the
findings of the reliability and availability analyses of the
TWMs:
(1) The preventive-maintenance schedules and proce-
dures for the TWM equipment at both DSS 14 and
DSS 63 need to be reviewed to achieve higher MTBF
levels for their TW/d assemblies.
(2) The TWM corrective-maintenance procedures and
support equipment at DSS 14 and DSS 63 need
to be evaluated for possible improvements in order
to achieve reduced repair durations and improved
TWM backup availabilities. This is essential to re-
duce the average MTTRS for the TWMs network-
wide.
(3) Improving and sustaining training for the maser op-
eration and maintenance personnel would help to
achieve a TWM availability performance consistent
with the specified requirements.
VII. Summary
This article has reported the results of the reliability
and availability analyses of the TWM assemblies at the
70-m antennas and has presented a stochastic availabil-
ity evaluation model of their operational configurations.
The dominant cause of TWM failures is contamination of
the helium gas in the CCRs. This is consistent with the
findings of a previous study; however, another important
finding is that p-roportTons of TWM failures attributed to
compressor and refrigerator drive-unit failureshave almost
doubled in recent years. The current MTBF level of the
TWMs for spacecraft support (approximately 930 hr) can
practically be improved. The average MTTRS can be re-
duced to 0.7 or 0.8 hr if TWM backup-assembly availabil-
ity is improved.
The MTBF and MDT levels 0fihe TWMs at the Can-
berra Complex DSS 43 indicate that it is possible to
achieve the desired levels of these parameters (MTBF of
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2500-3000hr; MDT of 36-48 hr) for the present TWMs
at both DSS 14 and DSS 63 when operation and mainte-
nance procedures are consistently improved and practiced.
Individual availabilities of TWMs at DSS 14 are consid-
erably lower than corresponding levels for the TWMs at
DSS 43 and DSS 63. That is indicative of the adverse im-
pact of the relatively higher MDT (84 hr) for the TWMs
at DSS 14.
The derived stochastic expressions provide adequate
measures of the S- and X-band TWM standby configura-
tion avaiiabilitles and allow for the evaluation o_sl_u]tane-
ous operational availability of these configurations for their --- =
Antenna Microwave Subsystem. The application of these
availability expressions to the 70-m antenna TWM config-
urations indicates-a relatively lower operational avail abil±
ity level achieved at DSS 14. That is primarily attributed
to the higher MDT of the failed TWM at this station. The
proposed measures can be considered as useful tools to
examine possible MTBF and MDT trade-offs that would
result in an improved TWM configurations' operational
availabilities at the 70-m antennas.
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Table 1. Basic performance requirements of the 70-m antenna TWM assemblies.
Perro_ pareaneter S-lxmd (Block III, IV, V) X-band (Block IIA)
Frequency, MHz 227O--2300
- Gain contribution, dB
Pe_k .......... 45
Minimum 44
Gain stability,dB
Stationary-10 sec 0.03-0.05
Stationary-12 hr 0.5
Moving 0.5-2.0
Noise temperature contributions, K =_= 8_10 Biock iII
<5.0 Blocks IV,V
8400-8500
45
44
0.03
0.5
0.5
<4.0
S: S _: : ?
Table 2. Fa|Iura-oauae distribution of tha _-m anionna _ assembl|es.
Area of failure
Number of TWM failures
DSS 14 DSS 43 DSS 63
Number of failures Total
(subnet) failures,percent
Helium refrigerator 24 16 25 65 69.8
Contamination (19) (12) (20) (51) (54.8)
Other (drive unit, etc.) (5) (4) (5) (14) (15.0)
Helium compressor 4 2 5 11 11.8
Low flow 4 2 3 9 9.7
Power supply/dlstrlq_ut;on 2 1 2 5 5.4
M_scelianeous (pu_p, -- .... O- " 2 1 3 3.3
]dystron, maser, etc.)
Total 34 23 36 93 I00
_.-<__:=_ _
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Table 3. MTBF history of the DSN TWM assemblies.
Time period Approximate MTBF, hr Remarks
DSN DR's data for
Late 1960s 1000-1300
Late 1970s (1979-1981) 3000
Early 1980s (1982-1983) 1000-1200
Station reports' data for
Early 1990s (1990-1991)
1400-1600 (S-band)
1600 (X-band)
5000 (S-band)
2400-4000 (X-band)
1900-2500 (S-band)
1400-1800 (X-band)
All complexes/stations
All complexes/statlons
All complexes/stations
Goldstone Complex; only DSS14
Canberra Complex; only DSS 43
Madrid Complex; only DSS 63
Table 4. Telemetry data system availability based on Its major subsystem contributions.
Number of Total outage, MTBF, MTTRS, Telemetry
Subsystem outages hr hr hr availability, percent a
Antenna Mechanical 229 200 171 0.9 99.50
Antenna Microwave 69 96 567 1.4 99.76
(TWM included)
Radio Frequency Interference 00 160 244 0.9 99.61
Receiver 195 74 220 0.4 99.82
Telemetry 472 271 92 0.6 ..... 9-9._ ="
Facility 34 35 3760 0._'- ......... _._4
aData availability = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTRS)
Table 5. Telemetry date availability analysis based on the contributions of the 70-m station TWMs.
Schedule Total
Number of MTBF, MTTRS, Telemetry
outage,Station TWMs support time, outages hr hr availability, percent, a
hr hr
DSS 14 8356 15 14.6 557 0.97 99.83
DSS 43 9165 1 8.3 9165 8.3 99.91
DSS 63 9533 13 17.4 734 1.3 99.82
Total/average 27054 29 40.3 933 1.4 99.85
Data availability = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTRS)
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Table6.Aval:abllitycharacteristicsofTWMassembliesInthe?0-mantennasubnet.
DSS complex TWM Availability factor Availability measure
type
MTBF _ MDT b MPT c Ao Aa
DSS 14, Gold.tone, : Sl
California := 82
DSS 43, Canberra,
Australia
X1
X2
$1
S2
XI
X2
DSS 63, Madrid, S1
Spain $2
Xl
X2
1361 92,6 48 0,93629 0.90636
1963 72,0 48 0.96462 0.94239
1628 : 88.0 48 0.95990 0.93348
1601 95.0 48 0.94399 0.91800
5078 42.0 N/A d 0.99178 0.99178
5091 21,0 N/A 0.99589 0.99589
5079 33.0 N/A 0.99354 0.99354
1232 46.75 N/A 0.96344 0,96344
1987 38.4 32 0.98104 0.96578
sos6 20.0 38 0.9960s 0.989o5
1070 54.0 30 0.95196 0.92721
3568 64.0 36 0.98238 0.97274
a The MTBF_levels shown are calculated_as t_e tot_ operating hours of each _ divided by the
number of TWM failure (outage) events for the period considered.
b The MDT shown is calculated as the total outage times and repair times divided by the number
of reported failures for each TWM assembly.
CThe MPT shown is calculated as the total preventive-maintenance time divided by the number of
preventive activities performed for a period.
d Indicates that preventive-maintenance activities were not scheduled for the period considered.
I__- _ _
Table 7. A comparlson of TWM availabilities at the 70-m stations.
DSS-TWMs Operational availability Average availability
(proposed measures), percent (DSN DR system), percent
t
99.9_.09 99.91
9g.8g--g9,97- 99.82
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Fig. 1. Functional block diagram for the traveling wave maser
(TWM) amplifiers in the 70-m antenna microwave subsystem.
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Rg. 2. Simplified TWM/CCR Group Equipment Connections diagram.
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Fig. 3. Fault tree for a TWM assembly (top failure events are shown; basic component
failures are not specified).
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Fig. 4. State-space performance model for s two-assembly
standby TWM configuration.
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Fig. 5. Operational availability of S- and X-band TWM configura-
tion versus TWM assembly MTBF at various levels of TWM As-
sembly MDT: (a) Goldstona, DSS 14; (b) Canberra, DSS 43; and
(c) Madrid, DSS 63.
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